diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/HISTORY ./HISTORY --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/HISTORY 2023-04-18 15:41:39.000000000 -0400 +++ ./HISTORY 2024-01-22 12:17:59.000000000 -0500 @@ -24915,3 +24915,37 @@ return "not found" instead of "error" during the time that all MySQL server connections were turned down after error. Found during code maintenance. File: global/dict_mysql.c. + +20240109 + + Security (outbound SMTP smuggling): with the default setting + "cleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf = yes" Postfix will replace + stray or characters in message content with a + space character. This prevents Postfix from enabling + outbound (remote) SMTP smuggling, and it also makes evaluation + of Postfix-added DKIM etc. signatures independent from how + a remote mail server handles stray or characters. + Files: global/mail_params.h, cleanup/cleanup.c, + cleanup/cleanup_message.c, mantools/postlink, proto/postconf.proto. + +20240112 + + Security (inbound SMTP smuggling): with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline + = normalize" (default "no" for Postfix < 3.9), the Postfix + SMTP server requires the standard End-of-DATA sequence + ., and otherwise allows command or message + content lines ending in the non-standard , processing + them as if the client sent the standard . + + The alternative setting, "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject" + will reject any command or message that contains a bare + , and is more likely to cause problems with legitimate + clients. + + For backwards compatibility, local clients are excluded by + default with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = + $mynetworks". + + Files: mantools/postlink, proto/postconf.proto, + global/mail_params.h, global/smtp_stream.c, global/smtp_stream.h, + smtpd/smtpd.c, smtpd/smtpd_check.[hc]. diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/RELEASE_NOTES ./RELEASE_NOTES --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/RELEASE_NOTES 2021-01-16 18:39:10.000000000 -0500 +++ ./RELEASE_NOTES 2024-01-22 12:18:45.000000000 -0500 @@ -16,6 +16,104 @@ If you upgrade from Postfix 3.2 or earlier, read RELEASE_NOTES-3.3 before proceeding. +Incompatibility with Postfix 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, and 3.5.24 +============================================================== + +Improvements for outbound SMTP smuggling defense: + +- With "cleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf = yes" (the default), the cleanup + daemon replaces each stray or character in message + content with a space character. The replacement happens before + any other content management (header/body_checks, Milters, etc). + + This prevents outbound SMTP smuggling, where an attacker uses + Postfix to send email containing a non-standard End-of-DATA + sequence, to exploit inbound SMTP smuggling at a vulnerable remote + SMTP server. + + This also improves the remote evaluation of Postfix-added DKIM + and other signatures, as the evaluation result will not depend + on how a remote email server handles stray or characters. + +This feature applies to all email that Postfix locally or remotely +sends out. It is not allowlisted based on client identity. + +Major changes with Postfix 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, and 3.5.24 +============================================================ + +Improvements for inbound SMTP smuggling defense: + +- Better compatibility: the recommended setting "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline + = normalize" requires the standard End-of-DATA sequence + ., but allows bare newlines from SMTP clients, + maintaining more compatibility with existing infrastructure. + +- Improved logging for rejected input (it now includes queue ID, + helo, mail, and rcpt, if available). + +- The setting "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject" requires + that input lines end in , requires the standard End-of-DATA + sequence ., and rejects a command or message that + contains a bare newline. To disconnect the client, specify + "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code = 521". + +- The Postfix SMTP server no longer strips extra as in + ., to silence false alarms from test tools + that send attack sequences that real mail servers cannot send. + Details at https://www.postfix.org/false-smuggling-claims.html + +- The old setting "yes" has become an alias for "normalize". + +- The old setting "no" has not changed, and allows SMTP smuggling. + +The recommended settings are now: + + # Require the standard End-of-DATA sequence .. + # Otherwise, allow bare and process it as if the client sent + # . + # + # This maintains compatibility with many legitimate SMTP client + # applications that send a mix of standard and non-standard line + # endings, but will fail to receive email from client implementations + # that do not terminate DATA content with the standard End-of-DATA + # sequence .. + # + # Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions. + # The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks. + # + smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize + smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks + +Alternative settings: + + # Reject input lines that contain and log a "bare received" + # error. Require that input lines end in , and require the + # standard End-of-DATA sequence .. + # + # This will reject email from SMTP clients that send any non-standard + # line endings such as web applications, netcat, or load balancer + # health checks. + # + # This will also reject email from services that use BDAT to send + # MIME text containing a bare newline (RFC 3030 Section 3 requires + # canonical MIME format for text message types, defined in RFC 2045 + # Sections 2.7 and 2.8). + # + # Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions. + # The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks. + # + smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject + smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks + # + # Alternatively, in the case of BDAT violations, BDAT can be selectively + # disabled with smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps, or globally + # disabled with smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords. + # + # smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps = cidr:/path/to/file + # /path/to/file: + # 10.0.0.0/24 chunking, silent-discard + # smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords = chunking, silent-discard + Runtime detection of DNSSEC support ----------------------------------- diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/html/cleanup.8.html ./html/cleanup.8.html --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/html/cleanup.8.html 2019-02-03 14:22:07.000000000 -0500 +++ ./html/cleanup.8.html 2024-01-22 12:21:49.000000000 -0500 @@ -146,6 +146,16 @@ The set of characters that Postfix will remove from message con- tent. + Available in Postfix version 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24, and + later: + + cleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf (yes) + Replace each stray <CR> or <LF> character in message content + with a space character, to prevent outbound SMTP smuggling, and + to make the evaluation of Postfix-added DKIM or other signatures + independent from how a remote mail server handles such charac- + ters. + BEFORE QUEUE MILTER CONTROLS As of version 2.3, Postfix supports the Sendmail version 8 Milter (mail filter) protocol. When mail is not received via the smtpd(8) server, diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/html/postconf.5.html ./html/postconf.5.html --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/html/postconf.5.html 2021-01-17 10:13:32.000000000 -0500 +++ ./html/postconf.5.html 2024-01-22 12:24:39.000000000 -0500 @@ -1444,6 +1444,40 @@ +

cleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf +(default: yes)

+ +

Replace each stray <CR> or <LF> character in message +content with a space character, to prevent outbound SMTP smuggling, +and to make the evaluation of Postfix-added DKIM or other signatures +independent from how a remote mail server handles such characters. +

+ +

SMTP does not allow such characters unless they are part of a +<CR><LF> sequence, and different mail systems handle +such stray characters in an implementation-dependent manner. Stray +<CR> or <LF> characters could be used for outbound +SMTP smuggling, where an attacker uses a Postfix server to send +message content with a non-standard End-of-DATA sequence that +triggers inbound SMTP smuggling at a remote SMTP server.

+ +

The replacement happens before all other content management, +and before Postfix may add a DKIM etc. signature; if the signature +were created first, the replacement could invalidate the signature. +

+ +

In addition to preventing SMTP smuggling, replacing stray +<CR> or <LF> characters ensures that the result of +signature validation by later mail system will not depend on how +that mail system handles those stray characters in an +implementation-dependent manner.

+ +

This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, +3.6.14, and 3.5.24.

+ + +

cleanup_service_name (default: cleanup)

@@ -14984,6 +15018,153 @@

smtpd_forbid_bare_newline +(default: Postfix < 3.9: no)

+ +

Reject or restrict input lines from an SMTP client that end in +<LF> instead of the standard <CR><LF>. Such line +endings are commonly allowed with UNIX-based SMTP servers, but they +violate RFC 5321, and allowing such line endings can make a server +vulnerable to +SMTP smuggling.

+ +

Specify one of the following values (case does not matter):

+ +

normalize: Require the standard +End-of-DATA sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>. +Otherwise, allow command or message content lines ending in the +non-standard <LF>, and process them as if the client sent the +standard <CR><LF>.

This maintains compatibility +with many legitimate SMTP client applications that send a mix of +standard and non-standard line endings, but will fail to receive +email from client implementations that do not terminate DATA content +with the standard End-of-DATA sequence +<CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.

Such clients +can be excluded with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions.
yes: Compatibility alias for normalize.
reject: Require the standard End-of-DATA +sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>. Reject a command +or message content when a line contains bare <LF>, log a "bare +<LF> received" error, and reply with the SMTP status code in +$smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code.

This will reject +email from SMTP clients that send any non-standard line endings +such as web applications, netcat, or load balancer health checks. +

This will also reject email from services that use BDAT +to send MIME text containing a bare newline (RFC 3030 Section 3 +requires canonical MIME format for text message types, defined in +RFC 2045 Sections 2.7 and 2.8).

Such clients can be +excluded with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions (or, in the case +of BDAT violations, BDAT can be selectively disabled with +smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps, or globally disabled with +smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords).
no (default): Do not require the standard +End-of-DATA +sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>. Always process +a bare <LF> as if the client sent <CR><LF>. This +option is fully backwards compatible, but is not recommended for +an Internet-facing SMTP server, because it is vulnerable to SMTP smuggling. +

+ +

Recommended settings:

+ +

+# Require the standard End-of-DATA sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
+# Otherwise, allow bare <LF> and process it as if the client sent
+# <CR><LF>.
+#
+# This maintains compatibility with many legitimate SMTP client
+# applications that send a mix of standard and non-standard line
+# endings, but will fail to receive email from client implementations
+# that do not terminate DATA content with the standard End-of-DATA
+# sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
+#
+# Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions.
+# The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks.
+#
+smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize
+smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks
+

+ +

Alternative:

+ +

+# Reject input lines that contain <LF> and log a "bare <LF> received"
+# error. Require that input lines end in <CR><LF>, and require the
+# standard End-of-DATA sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
+#
+# This will reject email from SMTP clients that send any non-standard
+# line endings such as web applications, netcat, or load balancer
+# health checks.
+#
+# This will also reject email from services that use BDAT to send
+# MIME text containing a bare newline (RFC 3030 Section 3 requires
+# canonical MIME format for text message types, defined in RFC 2045
+# Sections 2.7 and 2.8).
+#
+# Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions.
+# The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks.
+#
+smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject
+smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks
+#
+# Alternatively, in the case of BDAT violations, BDAT can be selectively
+# disabled with smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps, or globally
+# disabled with smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords.
+#
+# smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps = cidr:/path/to/file
+# /path/to/file:
+#     10.0.0.0/24 chunking, silent-discard
+# smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords = chunking, silent-discard
+

+ +

This feature with settings yes and no is available +in Postfix 3.8.4, 3.7.9, 3.6.13, and 3.5.23. Additionally, the +settings reject, and normalize are available with +Postfix ≥ 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, and 3.5.24.

+ + +

+ +

smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions +(default: $mynetworks)

+ +

Exclude the specified clients from smtpd_forbid_bare_newline +enforcement. This setting uses the same syntax and parent-domain +matching behavior as mynetworks.

+ +

This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.9, 3.8.4, 3.7.9, +3.6.13, and 3.5.23.

+ + +

+ +

smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code +(default: 550)

+ +

+The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when rejecting a +request with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject". +Specify a 5XX status code (521 to disconnect). +

+ +

This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, +3.6.14, and 3.5.24.

+ + +

smtpd_forbidden_commands (default: CONNECT, GET, POST)

diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/html/smtpd.8.html ./html/smtpd.8.html --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/html/smtpd.8.html 2021-01-16 19:37:59.000000000 -0500 +++ ./html/smtpd.8.html 2024-01-22 11:51:16.000000000 -0500 @@ -895,6 +895,22 @@ to send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not Postfix actually accepts those commands. + Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.4, 3.7.9, 3.6.13, 3.5.23 and later: + + smtpd_forbid_bare_newline (Postfix < 3.9: no) + Reject or restrict input lines from an SMTP client that end in + <LF> instead of the standard <CR><LF>. + + smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions ($mynetworks) + Exclude the specified clients from smtpd_forbid_bare_newline + enforcement. + + Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24 and later: + + smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code (550) + The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when rejecting a + request with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject". + TARPIT CONTROLS When a remote SMTP client makes errors, the Postfix SMTP server can insert delays before responding. This can help to slow down run-away diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/man/man5/postconf.5 ./man/man5/postconf.5 --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/man/man5/postconf.5 2021-01-17 10:13:32.000000000 -0500 +++ ./man/man5/postconf.5 2024-01-22 12:24:36.000000000 -0500 @@ -845,6 +845,32 @@ .fi .ad .ft R +.SH cleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf (default: yes) +Replace each stray or character in message +content with a space character, to prevent outbound SMTP smuggling, +and to make the evaluation of Postfix\-added DKIM or other signatures +independent from how a remote mail server handles such characters. +.PP +SMTP does not allow such characters unless they are part of a + sequence, and different mail systems handle +such stray characters in an implementation\-dependent manner. Stray + or characters could be used for outbound +SMTP smuggling, where an attacker uses a Postfix server to send +message content with a non\-standard End\-of\-DATA sequence that +triggers inbound SMTP smuggling at a remote SMTP server. +.PP +The replacement happens before all other content management, +and before Postfix may add a DKIM etc. signature; if the signature +were created first, the replacement could invalidate the signature. +.PP +In addition to preventing SMTP smuggling, replacing stray + or characters ensures that the result of +signature validation by later mail system will not depend on how +that mail system handles those stray characters in an +implementation\-dependent manner. +.PP +This feature is available in Postfix >= 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, +3.6.14, and 3.5.24. .SH cleanup_service_name (default: cleanup) The name of the \fBcleanup\fR(8) service. This service rewrites addresses into the standard form, and performs \fBcanonical\fR(5) address mapping @@ -10140,6 +10166,154 @@ parameter $name expansion. .PP This feature is available in Postfix 2.0 and later. +.SH smtpd_forbid_bare_newline (default: Postfix < 3.9: no) +Reject or restrict input lines from an SMTP client that end in + instead of the standard . Such line +endings are commonly allowed with UNIX\-based SMTP servers, but they +violate RFC 5321, and allowing such line endings can make a server +vulnerable to +SMTP smuggling. +.PP +Specify one of the following values (case does not matter): +.IP "\fBnormalize\fR" +Require the standard +End\-of\-DATA sequence .. +Otherwise, allow command or message content lines ending in the +non\-standard , and process them as if the client sent the +standard . +.br +.br +This maintains compatibility +with many legitimate SMTP client applications that send a mix of +standard and non\-standard line endings, but will fail to receive +email from client implementations that do not terminate DATA content +with the standard End\-of\-DATA sequence +.. +.br +.br +Such clients +can be excluded with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions. +.br +.IP "\fByes\fR" +Compatibility alias for \fBnormalize\fR. +.br +.IP "\fBreject\fR" +Require the standard End\-of\-DATA +sequence .. Reject a command +or message content when a line contains bare , log a "bare + received" error, and reply with the SMTP status code in +$smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code. +.br +.br +This will reject +email from SMTP clients that send any non\-standard line endings +such as web applications, netcat, or load balancer health checks. +.br +.br +This will also reject email from services that use BDAT +to send MIME text containing a bare newline (RFC 3030 Section 3 +requires canonical MIME format for text message types, defined in +RFC 2045 Sections 2.7 and 2.8). +.br +.br +Such clients can be +excluded with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions (or, in the case +of BDAT violations, BDAT can be selectively disabled with +smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps, or globally disabled with +smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords). +.br +.IP "\fBno\fR (default)" +Do not require the standard +End\-of\-DATA +sequence .. Always process +a bare as if the client sent . This +option is fully backwards compatible, but is not recommended for +an Internet\-facing SMTP server, because it is vulnerable to SMTP smuggling. +.br +.br +.PP +Recommended settings: +.sp +.in +4 +.nf +.na +.ft C +# Require the standard End\-of\-DATA sequence .. +# Otherwise, allow bare and process it as if the client sent +# . +# +# This maintains compatibility with many legitimate SMTP client +# applications that send a mix of standard and non\-standard line +# endings, but will fail to receive email from client implementations +# that do not terminate DATA content with the standard End\-of\-DATA +# sequence .. +# +# Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions. +# The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks. +# +smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize +smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks +.fi +.ad +.ft R +.in -4 +.PP +Alternative: +.sp +.in +4 +.nf +.na +.ft C +# Reject input lines that contain and log a "bare received" +# error. Require that input lines end in , and require the +# standard End\-of\-DATA sequence .. +# +# This will reject email from SMTP clients that send any non\-standard +# line endings such as web applications, netcat, or load balancer +# health checks. +# +# This will also reject email from services that use BDAT to send +# MIME text containing a bare newline (RFC 3030 Section 3 requires +# canonical MIME format for text message types, defined in RFC 2045 +# Sections 2.7 and 2.8). +# +# Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions. +# The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks. +# +smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject +smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks +# +# Alternatively, in the case of BDAT violations, BDAT can be selectively +# disabled with smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps, or globally +# disabled with smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords. +# +# smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps = cidr:/path/to/file +# /path/to/file: +# 10.0.0.0/24 chunking, silent\-discard +# smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords = chunking, silent\-discard +.fi +.ad +.ft R +.in -4 +.PP +This feature with settings \fByes\fR and \fBno\fR is available +in Postfix 3.8.4, 3.7.9, 3.6.13, and 3.5.23. Additionally, the +settings \fBreject\fR, and \fBnormalize\fR are available with +Postfix >= 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, and 3.5.24. +.SH smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions (default: $mynetworks) +Exclude the specified clients from smtpd_forbid_bare_newline +enforcement. This setting uses the same syntax and parent\-domain +matching behavior as mynetworks. +.PP +This feature is available in Postfix >= 3.9, 3.8.4, 3.7.9, +3.6.13, and 3.5.23. +.SH smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code (default: 550) +The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when rejecting a +request with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject". +Specify a 5XX status code (521 to disconnect). +.PP +This feature is available in Postfix >= 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, +3.6.14, and 3.5.24. .SH smtpd_forbidden_commands (default: CONNECT, GET, POST) List of commands that cause the Postfix SMTP server to immediately terminate the session with a 221 code. This can be used to disconnect diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/man/man8/cleanup.8 ./man/man8/cleanup.8 --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/man/man8/cleanup.8 2019-02-03 14:22:05.000000000 -0500 +++ ./man/man8/cleanup.8 2024-01-22 12:21:07.000000000 -0500 @@ -146,6 +146,14 @@ .IP "\fBmessage_strip_characters (empty)\fR" The set of characters that Postfix will remove from message content. +.PP +Available in Postfix version 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, +3.5.24, and later: +.IP "\fBcleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf (yes)\fR" +Replace each stray or character in message +content with a space character, to prevent outbound SMTP smuggling, +and to make the evaluation of Postfix\-added DKIM or other signatures +independent from how a remote mail server handles such characters. .SH "BEFORE QUEUE MILTER CONTROLS" .na .nf diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/man/man8/smtpd.8 ./man/man8/smtpd.8 --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/man/man8/smtpd.8 2022-02-05 18:35:23.000000000 -0500 +++ ./man/man8/smtpd.8 2024-01-22 11:47:23.000000000 -0500 @@ -791,6 +791,20 @@ The maximal number of AUTH commands that any client is allowed to send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not Postfix actually accepts those commands. +.PP +Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.4, 3.7.9, 3.6.13, 3.5.23 and later: +.IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline (Postfix < 3.9: no)\fR" +Reject or restrict input lines from an SMTP client that end in + instead of the standard . +.IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions ($mynetworks)\fR" +Exclude the specified clients from smtpd_forbid_bare_newline +enforcement. +.PP +Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24 and +later: +.IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code (550)\fR" +The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when rejecting a +request with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject". .SH "TARPIT CONTROLS" .na .nf diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/mantools/postlink ./mantools/postlink --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/mantools/postlink 2021-01-16 18:36:30.000000000 -0500 +++ ./mantools/postlink 2024-01-22 12:38:01.000000000 -0500 @@ -548,6 +548,10 @@ s;\bsmtpd_etrn_restrictions\b;$&;g; s;\bsmtpd_expansion_filter\b;$&;g; s;\bsmtpd_for[-]*\n*[ ]*bidden_commands\b;$&;g; + s;\bsmtpd_for[-]*\n*[ ]*bid_bare_new[-]*\n*[ ]*line\b;$&;g; + s;\bsmtpd_for[-]*\n*[ ]*bid_bare_new[-]*\n*[ ]*line_reject_code\b;$&;g; + s;\bsmtpd_for[-]*\n*[ ]*bid_bare_new[-]*\n*[ ]*line_exclusions\b;$&;g; + s;\bcleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf\b;$&;g; s;\bsmtpd_hard_error_limit\b;$&;g; s;\bsmtpd_helo_required\b;$&;g; s;\bsmtpd_helo_restrictions\b;$&;g; diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/proto/postconf.proto ./proto/postconf.proto --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/proto/postconf.proto 2021-01-17 10:13:27.000000000 -0500 +++ ./proto/postconf.proto 2024-01-22 12:06:41.000000000 -0500 @@ -17681,3 +17681,169 @@

This feature was backported from Postfix 3.6 to Postfix versions 3.5.9, 3.4.19, 3.3.16. 3.2.21.

+ +%PARAM smtpd_forbid_bare_newline Postfix < 3.9: no + +

+ +

Specify one of the following values (case does not matter):

+ +

normalize: Require the standard +End-of-DATA sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>. +Otherwise, allow command or message content lines ending in the +non-standard <LF>, and process them as if the client sent the +standard <CR><LF>.

This maintains compatibility +with many legitimate SMTP client applications that send a mix of +standard and non-standard line endings, but will fail to receive +email from client implementations that do not terminate DATA content +with the standard End-of-DATA sequence +<CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.

Such clients +can be excluded with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions.
yes: Compatibility alias for normalize.
reject: Require the standard End-of-DATA +sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>. Reject a command +or message content when a line contains bare <LF>, log a "bare +<LF> received" error, and reply with the SMTP status code in +$smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code.

This will reject +email from SMTP clients that send any non-standard line endings +such as web applications, netcat, or load balancer health checks. +

This will also reject email from services that use BDAT +to send MIME text containing a bare newline (RFC 3030 Section 3 +requires canonical MIME format for text message types, defined in +RFC 2045 Sections 2.7 and 2.8).

Such clients can be +excluded with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions (or, in the case +of BDAT violations, BDAT can be selectively disabled with +smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps, or globally disabled with +smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords).
no (default): Do not require the standard +End-of-DATA +sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>. Always process +a bare <LF> as if the client sent <CR><LF>. This +option is fully backwards compatible, but is not recommended for +an Internet-facing SMTP server, because it is vulnerable to SMTP smuggling. +

+ +

Recommended settings:

+ +

+# Require the standard End-of-DATA sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
+# Otherwise, allow bare <LF> and process it as if the client sent
+# <CR><LF>.
+#
+# This maintains compatibility with many legitimate SMTP client
+# applications that send a mix of standard and non-standard line
+# endings, but will fail to receive email from client implementations
+# that do not terminate DATA content with the standard End-of-DATA
+# sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
+#
+# Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions.
+# The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks.
+#
+smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize
+smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks
+

+ +

Alternative:

+ +

+# Reject input lines that contain <LF> and log a "bare <LF> received"
+# error. Require that input lines end in <CR><LF>, and require the
+# standard End-of-DATA sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
+#
+# This will reject email from SMTP clients that send any non-standard
+# line endings such as web applications, netcat, or load balancer
+# health checks.
+#
+# This will also reject email from services that use BDAT to send
+# MIME text containing a bare newline (RFC 3030 Section 3 requires
+# canonical MIME format for text message types, defined in RFC 2045
+# Sections 2.7 and 2.8).
+#
+# Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions.
+# The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks.
+#
+smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject
+smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks
+#
+# Alternatively, in the case of BDAT violations, BDAT can be selectively
+# disabled with smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps, or globally
+# disabled with smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords.
+#
+# smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps = cidr:/path/to/file
+# /path/to/file:
+#     10.0.0.0/24 chunking, silent-discard
+# smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords = chunking, silent-discard
+

+ +

+ +%PARAM smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions $mynetworks + +

Exclude the specified clients from smtpd_forbid_bare_newline +enforcement. This setting uses the same syntax and parent-domain +matching behavior as mynetworks.

+ +

This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.9, 3.8.4, 3.7.9, +3.6.13, and 3.5.23.

+ +%PARAM smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code 550 + +

+The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when rejecting a +request with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject". +Specify a 5XX status code (521 to disconnect). +

+ +

This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, +3.6.14, and 3.5.24.

+ +%PARAM cleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf yes + +

+ +

The replacement happens before all other content management, +and before Postfix may add a DKIM etc. signature; if the signature +were created first, the replacement could invalidate the signature. +

+ +

This feature is available in Postfix ≥ 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, +3.6.14, and 3.5.24.

+ diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/cleanup/cleanup.c ./src/cleanup/cleanup.c --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/cleanup/cleanup.c 2019-02-03 14:22:05.000000000 -0500 +++ ./src/cleanup/cleanup.c 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -128,6 +128,14 @@ /* .IP "\fBmessage_strip_characters (empty)\fR" /* The set of characters that Postfix will remove from message /* content. +/* .PP +/* Available in Postfix version 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, +/* 3.5.24, and later: +/* .IP "\fBcleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf (yes)\fR" +/* Replace each stray or character in message +/* content with a space character, to prevent outbound SMTP smuggling, +/* and to make the evaluation of Postfix-added DKIM or other signatures +/* independent from how a remote mail server handles such characters. /* BEFORE QUEUE MILTER CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/cleanup/cleanup_init.c ./src/cleanup/cleanup_init.c --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/cleanup/cleanup_init.c 2022-04-17 18:16:01.000000000 -0400 +++ ./src/cleanup/cleanup_init.c 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int var_always_add_hdrs; /* always add missing headers */ int var_virt_addrlen_limit; /* stop exponential growth */ char *var_hfrom_format; /* header_from_format */ +int var_cleanup_mask_stray_cr_lf; /* replace stray CR or LF with space */ const CONFIG_INT_TABLE cleanup_int_table[] = { VAR_HOPCOUNT_LIMIT, DEF_HOPCOUNT_LIMIT, &var_hopcount_limit, 1, 0, @@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ VAR_VERP_BOUNCE_OFF, DEF_VERP_BOUNCE_OFF, &var_verp_bounce_off, VAR_AUTO_8BIT_ENC_HDR, DEF_AUTO_8BIT_ENC_HDR, &var_auto_8bit_enc_hdr, VAR_ALWAYS_ADD_HDRS, DEF_ALWAYS_ADD_HDRS, &var_always_add_hdrs, + VAR_CLEANUP_MASK_STRAY_CR_LF, DEF_CLEANUP_MASK_STRAY_CR_LF, &var_cleanup_mask_stray_cr_lf, 0, }; diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/cleanup/cleanup_message.c ./src/cleanup/cleanup_message.c --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/cleanup/cleanup_message.c 2021-07-24 18:31:05.000000000 -0400 +++ ./src/cleanup/cleanup_message.c 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -927,6 +927,23 @@ char *dst; /* + * Replace each stray CR or LF with one space. These are not allowed in + * SMTP, and can be used to enable outbound (remote) SMTP smuggling. + * Replacing these early ensures that our later DKIM etc. signature will + * not be invalidated. Besides preventing SMTP smuggling, replacing stray + * or ensures that the result of signature validation by a + * later mail system will not depend on how that mail system handles + * those stray characters in an implementation-dependent manner. + * + * The input length is not changed, therefore it is safe to overwrite the + * input. + */ + if (var_cleanup_mask_stray_cr_lf) + for (dst = (char *) buf; dst < buf + len; dst++) + if (*dst == '\r' || *dst == '\n') + *dst = ' '; + + /* * Reject unwanted characters. * * XXX Possible optimization: simplify the loop when the "reject" set diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/cleanup_strerror.c ./src/global/cleanup_strerror.c --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/cleanup_strerror.c 2008-01-08 16:07:47.000000000 -0500 +++ ./src/global/cleanup_strerror.c 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE, 552, "5.3.4", "message file too big", CLEANUP_STAT_CONT, 550, "5.7.1", "message content rejected", CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE, 451, "4.3.0", "queue file write error", + CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF, 521, "5.5.2", "bare received", }; static CLEANUP_STAT_DETAIL cleanup_stat_success = { diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/cleanup_user.h ./src/global/cleanup_user.h --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/cleanup_user.h 2014-07-13 11:15:53.000000000 -0400 +++ ./src/global/cleanup_user.h 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ #define CLEANUP_STAT_DEFER (1<<8) /* Temporary reject */ /* + * Non-cleanup errors that live in the same bitmask space, to centralize + * error handling. + */ +#define CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF (1<<16) /* Bare received */ + + /* * These are set when we can't bounce even if we were asked to. */ #define CLEANUP_STAT_MASK_CANT_BOUNCE \ diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/mail_params.h ./src/global/mail_params.h --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/mail_params.h 2022-03-22 18:22:03.000000000 -0400 +++ ./src/global/mail_params.h 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -4126,7 +4126,23 @@ extern char *var_smtpd_dns_re_filter; /* - * Share TLS sessions through tlproxy(8). + * Backwards compatibility. + */ +#define VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline" +#define DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF "no" + +#define VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions" +#define DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL "$" VAR_MYNETWORKS + +#define VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_CODE "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code" +#define DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_CODE 550 + +#define VAR_CLEANUP_MASK_STRAY_CR_LF "cleanup_replace_stray_cr_lf" +#define DEF_CLEANUP_MASK_STRAY_CR_LF 1 +extern int var_cleanup_mask_stray_cr_lf; + + /* + * Share TLS sessions through tlsproxy(8). */ #define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CONN_REUSE "smtp_tls_connection_reuse" #define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CONN_REUSE 0 diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/smtp_stream.c ./src/global/smtp_stream.c --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/smtp_stream.c 2018-11-30 18:41:11.000000000 -0500 +++ ./src/global/smtp_stream.c 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ /* VSTREAM *stream; /* char *format; /* va_list ap; +/* +/* int smtp_detect_bare_lf; +/* int smtp_got_bare_lf; /* AUXILIARY API /* int smtp_get_noexcept(vp, stream, maxlen, flags) /* VSTRING *vp; @@ -127,6 +130,11 @@ /* without timeouts and without making long jumps. Instead, /* query the stream status with vstream_feof() etc. /* +/* This function assigns smtp_got_bare_lf = smtp_detect_bare_lf, +/* if smtp_detect_bare_lf is non-zero and the last read line +/* was terminated with a bare newline. Otherwise, this function +/* sets smtp_got_bare_lf to zero. +/* /* smtp_timeout_setup() is a backwards-compatibility interface /* for programs that don't require per-record deadline support. /* DIAGNOSTICS @@ -201,6 +209,9 @@ #include "smtp_stream.h" +int smtp_detect_bare_lf; +int smtp_got_bare_lf; + /* smtp_timeout_reset - reset per-stream error flags, restart deadline timer */ static void smtp_timeout_reset(VSTREAM *stream) @@ -362,6 +373,8 @@ int last_char; int next_char; + smtp_got_bare_lf = 0; + /* * It's painful to do I/O with records that may span multiple buffers. * Allow for partial long lines (we will read the remainder later) and @@ -404,8 +417,15 @@ */ case '\n': vstring_truncate(vp, VSTRING_LEN(vp) - 1); - while (VSTRING_LEN(vp) > 0 && vstring_end(vp)[-1] == '\r') - vstring_truncate(vp, VSTRING_LEN(vp) - 1); + if (smtp_detect_bare_lf) { + if (VSTRING_LEN(vp) == 0 || vstring_end(vp)[-1] != '\r') + smtp_got_bare_lf = smtp_detect_bare_lf; + else + vstring_truncate(vp, VSTRING_LEN(vp) - 1); + } else { + while (VSTRING_LEN(vp) > 0 && vstring_end(vp)[-1] == '\r') + vstring_truncate(vp, VSTRING_LEN(vp) - 1); + } VSTRING_TERMINATE(vp); /* FALLTRHOUGH */ diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/smtp_stream.h ./src/global/smtp_stream.h --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/global/smtp_stream.h 2018-11-27 18:38:32.000000000 -0500 +++ ./src/global/smtp_stream.h 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ extern void smtp_fwrite(const char *, ssize_t len, VSTREAM *); extern void smtp_fread_buf(VSTRING *, ssize_t len, VSTREAM *); extern void smtp_fputc(int, VSTREAM *); +extern int smtp_detect_bare_lf; +extern int smtp_got_bare_lf; extern void smtp_vprintf(VSTREAM *, const char *, va_list); diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/smtpd/smtpd.c ./src/smtpd/smtpd.c --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/smtpd/smtpd.c 2021-11-15 08:42:43.000000000 -0500 +++ ./src/smtpd/smtpd.c 2024-01-22 12:39:30.000000000 -0500 @@ -745,6 +745,20 @@ /* The maximal number of AUTH commands that any client is allowed to /* send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not /* Postfix actually accepts those commands. +/* .PP +/* Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.4, 3.7.9, 3.6.13, 3.5.23 and later: +/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline (Postfix < 3.9: no)\fR" +/* Reject or restrict input lines from an SMTP client that end in +/* instead of the standard . +/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions ($mynetworks)\fR" +/* Exclude the specified clients from smtpd_forbid_bare_newline +/* enforcement. +/* .PP +/* Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24 and +/* later: +/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code (550)\fR" +/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when rejecting a +/* request with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject". /* TARPIT CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi @@ -1447,6 +1461,12 @@ char *var_smtpd_uproxy_proto; int var_smtpd_uproxy_tmout; +char *var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf; +char *var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl; +int var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code; +static int bare_lf_mask; +static NAMADR_LIST *bare_lf_excl; + /* * Silly little macros. */ @@ -1539,6 +1559,40 @@ */ static DICT *smtpd_cmd_filter; + /* + * Bare LF and End-of-DATA controls (bare CR is handled elsewhere). + * + * At the smtp_get*() line reader level, setting any of these flags in the + * smtp_detect_bare_lf variable enables the detection of bare newlines. The + * line reader will set the same flags in the smtp_got_bare_lf variable + * after it detects a bare newline, otherwise it clears smtp_got_bare_lf. + * + * At the SMTP command level, the flags in smtp_got_bare_lf control whether + * commands ending in a bare newline are rejected. + * + * At the DATA and BDAT content level, the flags in smtp_got_bare_lf control + * whether the standard End-of-DATA sequence CRLF.CRLF is required, and + * whether lines ending in bare newlines are rejected. + * + * Postfix implements "delayed reject" after detecting a bare newline in BDAT + * or DATA content. The SMTP server delays a REJECT response until the + * command is finished, instead of replying and hanging up immediately. The + * End-of-DATA detection is secured with BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD. + */ +#define BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD (1<<0) /* Require CRLF.CRLF */ +#define BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT (1<<1) /* Reject bare newline */ + +#define IS_BARE_LF_WANT_STD_EOD(m) ((m) & BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD) +#define IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(m) ((m) & BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT) + +static const NAME_CODE bare_lf_mask_table[] = { + "normalize", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD, /* Default */ + "yes", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD, /* Migration aid */ + "reject", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD | BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT, + "no", 0, + 0, -1, /* error */ +}; + #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH /* @@ -3479,6 +3533,7 @@ int curr_rec_type; int prev_rec_type; int first = 1; + int prev_got_bare_lf = 0; /* * Copy the message content. If the cleanup process has a problem, keep @@ -3492,12 +3547,15 @@ * XXX Deal with UNIX-style From_ lines at the start of message content * because sendmail permits it. */ - for (prev_rec_type = 0; /* void */ ; prev_rec_type = curr_rec_type) { + for (prev_rec_type = 0; /* void */ ; prev_rec_type = curr_rec_type, + prev_got_bare_lf = smtp_got_bare_lf) { if (smtp_get(state->buffer, state->client, var_line_limit, SMTP_GET_FLAG_NONE) == '\n') curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_NORM; else curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_CONT; + if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf)) + state->err |= CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF; start = vstring_str(state->buffer); len = VSTRING_LEN(state->buffer); if (first) { @@ -3510,9 +3568,14 @@ if (len > 0 && IS_SPACE_TAB(start[0])) out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "", 0); } - if (prev_rec_type != REC_TYPE_CONT && *start == '.' - && (proxy == 0 ? (++start, --len) == 0 : len == 1)) - break; + if (prev_rec_type != REC_TYPE_CONT && *start == '.') { + if (len == 1 && IS_BARE_LF_WANT_STD_EOD(smtp_detect_bare_lf) + && (smtp_got_bare_lf || prev_got_bare_lf)) + /* Do not store or send to proxy filter. */ + continue; + if (proxy == 0 ? (++start, --len) == 0 : len == 1) + break; + } if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) { if (var_message_limit > 0 && var_message_limit - state->act_size < len + 2) { state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE; @@ -3664,6 +3727,11 @@ else smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as %s", state->queue_id); + } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF) != 0) { + state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; + log_whatsup(state, "reject", "bare received"); + smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d 5.5.2 %s Error: bare received", + var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, var_myhostname); } else if (why && IS_SMTP_REJECT(STR(why))) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(why)); @@ -3981,6 +4049,8 @@ /* Skip the out_record() and VSTRING_RESET() calls below. */ break; } + if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf)) + state->err |= CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF; start = vstring_str(state->bdat_get_buffer); len = VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer); if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) { @@ -4633,6 +4703,9 @@ */ xclient_allowed = namadr_list_match(xclient_hosts, state->name, state->addr); + smtp_detect_bare_lf = (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((state)) == 0 && bare_lf_mask + && !namadr_list_match(bare_lf_excl, state->name, state->addr)) ? + bare_lf_mask : 0; /* NOT: tls_reset() */ if (got_helo == 0) helo_reset(state); @@ -5614,6 +5687,13 @@ } watchdog_pat(); smtpd_chat_query(state); + if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf)) { + log_whatsup(state, "reject", "bare received"); + state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; + smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d 5.5.2 %s Error: bare received", + var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, var_myhostname); + break; + } /* Safety: protect internal interfaces against malformed UTF-8. */ if (var_smtputf8_enable && valid_utf8_string(STR(state->buffer), LEN(state->buffer)) == 0) { @@ -5957,6 +6037,13 @@ namadr_list_match(xforward_hosts, state.name, state.addr); /* + * Reject or normalize bare LF, with compatibility exclusions. + */ + smtp_detect_bare_lf = (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 && bare_lf_mask + && !namadr_list_match(bare_lf_excl, state.name, state.addr)) ? + bare_lf_mask : 0; + + /* * See if we need to turn on verbose logging for this client. */ debug_peer_check(state.name, state.addr); @@ -6018,6 +6105,14 @@ hogger_list = namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN | match_parent_style(VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS), var_smtpd_hoggers); + bare_lf_excl = namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL, + MATCH_FLAG_RETURN + | match_parent_style(VAR_MYNETWORKS), + var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl); + if ((bare_lf_mask = name_code(bare_lf_mask_table, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, + var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf)) < 0) + msg_fatal("bad parameter value: '%s = %s'", + VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf); /* * Open maps before dropping privileges so we can read passwords etc. @@ -6314,6 +6409,7 @@ VAR_VIRT_MAILBOX_CODE, DEF_VIRT_MAILBOX_CODE, &var_virt_mailbox_code, 0, 0, VAR_RELAY_RCPT_CODE, DEF_RELAY_RCPT_CODE, &var_relay_rcpt_code, 0, 0, VAR_PLAINTEXT_CODE, DEF_PLAINTEXT_CODE, &var_plaintext_code, 0, 0, + VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_CODE, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_CODE, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, 500, 599, VAR_SMTPD_CRATE_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CRATE_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_crate_limit, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_CCONN_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CCONN_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cconn_limit, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_CMAIL_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CMAIL_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cmail_limit, 0, 0, @@ -6485,6 +6581,8 @@ VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_CONTEXT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_CONTEXT, &var_smtpd_policy_context, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, &var_smtpd_dns_re_filter, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_REJ_FTR_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_FTR_MAPS, &var_smtpd_rej_ftr_maps, 0, 0, + VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl, 0, 0, + VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf, 1, 0, 0, }; static const CONFIG_RAW_TABLE raw_table[] = { diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c ./src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c 2021-11-06 19:45:18.000000000 -0400 +++ ./src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ /* /* char *smtpd_check_queue(state) /* SMTPD_STATE *state; +/* AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS +/* void log_whatsup(state, action, text) +/* SMTPD_STATE *state; +/* const char *action; +/* const char *text; /* DESCRIPTION /* This module implements additional checks on SMTP client requests. /* A client request is validated in the context of the session state. @@ -146,6 +151,11 @@ /* The recipient address given with the RCPT TO or VRFY command. /* .IP size /* The message size given with the MAIL FROM command (zero if unknown). +/* .PP +/* log_whatsup() logs ": : +/* from: : " plus the protocol +/* (SMTP or ESMTP), and if available, EHLO, MAIL FROM, or RCPT +/* TO. /* BUGS /* Policies like these should not be hard-coded in C, but should /* be user-programmable instead. @@ -946,8 +956,8 @@ /* log_whatsup - log as much context as we have */ -static void log_whatsup(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *whatsup, - const char *text) +void log_whatsup(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *whatsup, + const char *text) { VSTRING *buf = vstring_alloc(100); diff -ur /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.h ./src/smtpd/smtpd_check.h --- /var/tmp/postfix-3.4.29/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.h 2017-12-27 17:29:45.000000000 -0500 +++ ./src/smtpd/smtpd_check.h 2024-01-22 11:39:22.000000000 -0500 @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ extern char *smtpd_check_data(SMTPD_STATE *); extern char *smtpd_check_eod(SMTPD_STATE *); extern char *smtpd_check_policy(SMTPD_STATE *, char *); +extern void log_whatsup(SMTPD_STATE *, const char *, const char *); /* LICENSE /* .ad